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Abstract 
The International Criminal Court’s arrest warrant of 4 March 2009 against Omar 
Hassan Al Bashir made the president of Sudan the first seated president to be indicted by 
the ICC in history. The ICC held Al Bashir accountable for crimes against humanity, as 
well as war crimes committed in the Darfur region. This case study is examined to 
highlight how state sovereignty is changing in today’s globalized world, and to 
underscore the role played by international institutions in domestic politics. The thesis 
examines the role of the ICC in the prosecution of Al Bashir from the perspective of the 
realist/internationalist debate. It debates the legality of the arrest warrant given that 
Sudan is not a party state to the ICC and that Al Bashir is a seated president. The thesis 
then analyzes United Nation Security Council Resolution 1593 that transferred Darfur’s 
case to the ICC, UN Chapter VII, the Rome Statute, the Geneva Convention on 
Genocide, and the Vienna Convention to make the case against the immunity of a seated 
president. The responses to the ICC indictment by Sudan as well as international and 
regional actors, namely United States of America, Russia, China, the European Union 
(EU), the African Union (AU) and the League of Arab States (LAS) are also observed 
briefly. The thesis closes by arguing that that there can be no peace in Sudan without 
indicting Al Bashir. Peace and reconciliation cannot be achieved without justice.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
  
1.1 Introduction 
Sudan’s history is that of coup d’états, conflict between the North and the South, 
as well as in Darfur. It is an ethnic conflict at the surface but in reality a conflict over 
power and resource sharing. The International Criminal Court (ICC) indicted recently 
Omar Hassan Al Bashir, the President of the Republic of Sudan, for war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. The Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs in Sudan, 
Ahmad Muhammad Harun, the alleged leader of the Janjaweed Militia, Ali Muhammad 
Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, also known as Ali Kushayb, and the chairman and general 
coordinator of military operations of the United Resistance Front, Bahr Idriss Abu Garda 
were also charged for similar crimes. This thesis focuses on the impact of the ICC 
indictments on Sudan. It attempts to answer the following questions: is the ICC 
indictment of Sudan’s president legal? What role do international institutions such as the 
ICC play in the international system? This thesis thus examines the ICC trial of Al 
Bashir, who has been in power for the last twenty years. It studies its effect on Sudan 
and whether the ICC can challenge the sovereignty of such a state. Will this bring it 
closer to a lasting peace?  
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1.2 Research Questions 
 Sudan’s case was referred to the ICC through the United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1593 (UNSCR) under Chapter VII. In an attempt to undermine the 
ICC’s credibility this referral is often charged of being politicized. This thesis is going to 
tackle questions such as: since Sudan did not sign the Rome Statute and is not a state 
party to the ICC, is the resolution forceful on it? What does the resolution require? What 
are the implications of United Nations (UN) Chapter VII, and what are Sudan’s 
obligations towards the ICC indictment? Resolution 1593 Chapter VII did not indict Al 
Bashir, nor did it mention any individuals, it only referred the case of Darfur to the ICC. 
The warrant of arrest came at a later stage. However, is it legal that a warrant of arrest be 
issued to a seated president, what about diplomatic immunity? Does international law 
support such immunity? What is more important justice or stability? 
 In order to answer these questions, I present a brief history of Sudan to explain 
how the country plunged into civil wars and how its president became involved in war 
crimes and violence that made it urgent for the international community to intervene. I 
examine Chapter VII of the UN Charter and the authority it has on all UN member 
states, as well as the UNSCR 1593 which referred Sudan’s case to the ICC. 
Subsequently, I study the ICC’s jurisdiction, the implications of its indictments and what 
it entails to sign the Rome Statute, specifically Article 27 of the Rome Statute that states 
that not even chief of states have any immunity before the Court. I also further prove the 
legality of indicting Al Bashir by studying Article IV of the Geneva Convention on 
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Genocide that confirms that chief of states do not have immunity and that they could be 
subject to a warrant of arrest as well as convicted. 
As aforementioned, that the UN Security Council (UNSC) refers a case to the 
ICC has never happened before and no matter how authoritative a Chapter VII 
resolution, nonetheless many limitations remain to be challenged in the Statute and the 
Court’s jurisdiction; what are some of these limitations? Moreover, and from a 
theoretical perspective, how does the Realist/ Liberal institutionalist debate situate the 
ICC and the Sudanese case study? The latter question is very important as I tackle the 
theoretical literature and how it applies to my case. In order to answer it I examine on 
one hand the arguments of the realists, neo-realists and offensive realists who consider 
the rules of international institutions not to be effective without the support of other 
systems. On the other hand, I look closely at the institutionalists’ viewpoint, which gives 
a greater role to institutions and what they actually embody. The ICC being the main 
example of an institution and the indictment of Al Bashir being the main case study, I 
argue that so far it succeeded in pressuring Al Bashir. I will show how it affected his 
decisions as well as Sudan’s behavior and choices. 
What is more important in Sudan stability or justice? Is it the right timing for the 
ICC to be seeking justice? And what are the national, regional and international 
implications of the ICC’s indictments of Al Bashir? To answer these two last questions, 
I study what conflict theory states about stability versus justice and when does conflict 
theory consider a conflict ripe enough to introduce justice.  
 
1.3 Case Selection 
4 
 
 This thesis focuses on the ICC, a permanent tribunal and international institution 
with the authority to judge individuals for genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes. I selected the ICC indictment of Al Bashir as a case study because he is the first 
seated president to be indicted in history and it is the first time that the UNSC refers a 
case to the ICC under Chapter VII.  My thesis examines the latter’s jurisdiction and the 
limits of its authority in regard to the arrest warrant of Al Bashir. The case study 
demonstrates the existent challenge in the interaction between states and international 
institutions and whether it is worth risking the country’s stability at the expense of 
achieving justice.1
1.4 Methodology 
 
 
 Sudan has very strict media laws and has only one national television station and 
one government owned newspaper. The rest have either been banned or shut down. 
Some newspapers have gone underground but rarely make it to the outside world. Thus, 
my research is mostly based on the regional and western media. I consider this to be a 
limitation for my research, since the information available is mostly gathered from the 
government of Sudan, or the outside world which has no firsthand knowledge of what is 
really happening on the ground, especially after Al Bashir expelled most of the 
humanitarian aid organizations. In addition, there are only few studies on the most recent 
political developments in Sudan. Consequently, I have opted to use a wide range of 
information/data and resources to fill this gap. I will be using books, journals, 
                                                          
1 Carr, International Relations Between the Two World Wars, 1919-1939, 153. 
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periodicals, website for international/regional and national organizations and centers as 
sources such as the UN, the International Crisis Group, Carnegie Endowment, Open 
Democracy, Darfur Now, and Enough Project among many others. I have also 
interviewed a presidential special attaché to Al Bashir, Dr. Mansour Khaled. Other 
individuals include Dr. Amin Mekki Medani, who is the President of the Sudan Human 
Rights Organization and the Director of Penal Reform International. 
 
1.5 Map of the Thesis   
The first chapter introduces the focus of my thesis and describes the situation of 
Sudan, Al Bashir and the ICC. A brief history of Sudan describes how the ICC became 
involved in investigating the crimes committed in Darfur as well as indicting Al Bashir. 
Chapter II advances the literature review, in which Sudan’s case is situated in its 
theoretical context, i.e. the Realist/Liberal Institutionalist debate. Taking the case of 
Sudan as a sovereign independent state and the ICC as an example of an international 
institution, this chapter tries to demonstrate the challenge that exists between these two 
entities. Chapter III situates my case study in a larger context which is the one of ethnic 
conflicts. Sudan has endured twenty years of civil war and the tensions are still very real 
today. Many fear a return to war especially that the conflict has not been resolved; and 
the parties in conflict have barely reached a settlement. Chapter IV sets out the legal 
foundations for the ICC indictment. Starting with the UNSCR 1593 under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter, this chapter shows the legality of the indictment and refers to Article 
4 of the Geneva Convention to disprove the immunity of government officials, 
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specifically Al Bashir. Finally, chapter V concludes the thesis by putting forward the 
question of stability versus justice, whether enforcing justice or maintaining stability in 
Sudan is more important. Sudan, regional actors and International actors have very 
different views regarding this question. This last chapter explores the repercussions that 
this indictment had on the region, taking mainly the African Union (AU) and the League 
of Arab States’ (LAS) response to the indictment. It examines the reactions of Sudan, 
the region and the international community to the warrant of arrest of Al Bashir. 
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Chapter 2 
The Institutionalist vs. Realist Debate and the ICC 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In the aftermath of World War II, the world witnessed the birth of many 
international institutions. The UN, Bretton Woods, General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) or what is known today as the World Trade Organization (WTO), and 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are among them. The United States of 
America (USA) played an instrumental role in the birth of these institutions, as the new 
institutional order served its own security and economic interests.  
This chapter examines the realist/institutionalist as well as the neo-realist/neo-
institutionalist debates. These theories have been dominant in international relations for 
the last decade and a half, especially with the advent of the Iraq War and the 
Afghanistan War. Realists believe that rules, which institutions set, are only effective 
inside the walls of these institutions and that they only last as long as other systems 
support them.2 States are thus the principal and main actors on the international scene. 
Neo-realists also consider states to be the main actors;3
                                                          
2 Ibid., 60. 
3 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 117. 
 however, they concede that the 
international system does have an impact on those states and that states should always 
secure themselves economically as well as militarily. Institutionalists, on the other hand, 
give institutions a much greater role, arguing that they influence state actions 
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significantly. It then discusses the ICC as a key international institution that was 
established for justice as a last resort, neither for economical gain nor for a military 
purpose. 
 
2.2 The Role of International Institutions 
States do not appreciate the interference of international institutions in their 
internal politics and sovereignty. International institutions were built after World War II 
to secure Western economic and military needs and interests. The fall of the Berlin wall 
in 1989 marked the end of the Cold War, and the world started moving towards 
globalization, and the internationalization of a great number of its policies. Reading 
political events from the perspective of international institutions gave theorists a new 
angle to study events away from the emphasis on power and state politics. In addition, a 
focus on institutions became more relevant as the economic and social dimensions of 
international politics became more important. Analyzing how those institutions 
influence society, what characterizes them, and the extent of their impact on the 
international system is the concern of liberal institutionalist theories. 
Robert Keohane considers institutions as entities “with specific rules, agreed 
upon by governments that pertain to particular sets of issues in international politics.”4
                                                          
4 Keohane, “Institutional Theory in International Relations,” 154. 
 
Expanding further on the definition of institutions, B. Guy Peters defines a good 
institution as “One capable of inculcating its values into the behavior of its members and 
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propagating those common values.”5 Neo-institutionalism claims that the policies set by 
those institutions are not always the ones to influence the values of a state; in most cases 
it is quite the contrary. More often, the values and interests of member states are the 
ones that influence those institutions and maneuver them in the direction of the goals 
they want to attain.6
                                                          
5 Peters, Institutional Theory in Political Science, 151. 
6 Powell and DiMaggio, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, 63. 
 It is also more practical for states to sign treaties and be part of 
institutions especially when common interests and values converge. Institutions are more 
likely to succeed if they establish legitimacy within the institutional environment.  
Members of an institution often start their activities on the basis of their common 
professional values. When common values converge into one institution, it opens up 
opportunities to set common rules and the members start abiding by certain mutual 
regulations. This may restrain their behavior in favor of more ambitious objectives such 
as peace, prosperity, and justice. 
Values such as inclination towards peace over war, international justice, and 
criminal justice made international politics the prime concern of every citizen around the 
world. Today, with the help of the mass media, bloggers and the advancement in 
technologies promoting globalization, international politics seems not so different from 
domestic politics. However, international institutions are always under-valued, with the 
recurring argument that they are weak entities that cannot have real influence on the 
international scene. The assumption is that institutions do not have armed forces and 
thus cannot use force to implement their rules and regulations on states in the 
international system, which renders them as weaker actors.  
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Institutionalists beg to differ, however. Robert Keohane suggests that when 
“Great powers respect the jurisdiction of lesser powers it is not because they lack the 
capacity to intervene but rather because the rules of the game mandate such respect.”7 
Also neo-institutionalists such as John W. Meyer, argue that institutions do not only 
have economical or military functions, they are gaining legitimacy in the international 
system at large. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), for instance, was created to 
insure that states respect international law and each other’s national sovereignty. In 
October 2007 the ICJ handed down a ruling to end an eight-year contestation between 
Nicaragua and Honduras over their Caribbean Sea boundaries. Both countries have 
agreed to accept the ruling, thus bringing the dispute to an end. Here the ICJ played a 
very effective role regarding a serious dispute that could have potentially created a war 
between those two states if left unresolved. Instead they trusted their case to an 
institution, which was able to solve it peacefully and in accordance with international 
law.8
2.3 Realists/Neo-realists vs. Institutionalists/Neo-Institutionalists 
 This example demonstrates how institutions can play a decisive role on the 
international scene. 
 
On the one hand, neo-realists such as Mearsheimer criticize institutionalists and 
argue that “Institutions have minimal influence on state behavior, and thus hold little 
                                                          
7 Carr, International Relations Between the Two World Wars, 1919-1939, 153. 
8 International Court of Justice, “Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the 
Caribbean Sea.” 
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promise for promoting stability in the post-Cold War world.”9
Alas, not all institutions are influential. Some are marginal, and others merely 
have observatory roles or advocacy functions. In reality institutions influence states 
differently, some try to play the role of think thanks and lobby against certain 
 Mearsheimer does not 
believe that international institutions play an important role in preventing states from 
going to war. On the contrary, he believes that they are only tools created by the most 
powerful states in order to have better control over their share of world power. In his 
opinion, institutions are only mirrors of the distribution of power in the system and not a 
balancing factor. 
On the other hand, institutionalists accept most of what Mearsheimer puts 
forward that summarizes the three basic realist assumptions, which are that (1) states are 
the principal actors in world politics; (2) that they can be analyzed as rational actors; and 
(3) that they are not altruistic but, rather, are broadly ‘self-interested’. Superpowers are 
undoubtedly the main actors on the international scene, and there is no doubt that those 
powers do interfere in the national sovereignty of weaker powers, bend the rules set by 
international institutions, and sometimes ignore them all together. However, through 
certain international institutions such as the ICJ, or Human Rights Commissions, or the 
ICC, advocacy groups and citizens around the world are able to observe, denounce, 
judge and even indict political actors when they commit a crime or an illegal act.  The 
international community subjects these superpowers, just like weaker powers, to daily 
scrutiny. Furthermore, these institutions can take measures whether they are directly or 
indirectly given the authority to interfere.  
                                                          
9 Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” 2. 
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governmental decisions, others try to shape the media. Some institutions, like the UN, 
enjoy greater legitimacy and authority that may force states to abide by their rulings or 
be subject to sanctions. The question is not whether international institutions play a 
major role in world politics in an absolute sense of power politics, but how much and in 
what ways do they have an effect on power politics? How do they influence the 
supposedly more established and effective institutions of domestic politics?10
2.4 Putting Faith in Institutionalism 
 
 
 It may be argued that Nicaragua and Honduras are not major powers or really 
matter much in the global world, and that they do not constitute a good example of 
powerful states yielding their powers to an institution, namely the ICJ. Moreover, it 
could be argued that major powers have previously ignored ICJ rulings as well as the 
ruling of other international institutions, and this might not be likely to change in the 
near future. Nonetheless, institutionalists insist that the fact that some countries, no 
matter how weak or seemingly trivial in the international system, are willing to accept 
what an international organization rules, is enormously significant today.11
States like the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) have considerable power. 
They are all members of very powerful institutions such as the UN, International 
 The world 
order is constantly changing, new powers are emerging, tipping the balance, and the new 
world order is giving more leeway to institutions that are slowly gaining more normative 
legitimacy and power. 
                                                          
10 Lake, “Progress in International Relations: Beyond Paradigms in the Study of Institutions,” 135. 
11 Carr, International Relations Between the Two World Wars, 1919-1939, 62. 
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Monetary Fund (IMF), WTO and their weight is becoming more and more visible. 
International public opinion is increasingly getting involved in international politics, and 
is taking into consideration the work of these institutions. These institutions are proving 
to be very effective in times of crisis (natural disasters, economic crisis etc.). They are 
also very important when injustices are taking place in mobilizing civil society to 
denounce crimes against humanity anywhere around the world even in the most 
authoritarian systems. The international system has more venues now that facilitate 
communication, information sharing and cooperation to ensure a more just and more 
peaceful world.   
The UN is even reconsidering the makeup of its permanent members at the 
UNSC, as some member states have been protesting about not having the right to veto. 
The fact that permanent members no longer reflect the power sharing concretely in the 
international system is a key issue, and the UNSC is considering reforming its system.12 
Oran R. Young argues that “this could change the rules of the game when it comes to the 
bargaining power of those who participate in institutionalized activities at the 
international level.”13
                                                          
12 Young, “Are Institutions Intervening Variables or Basic Causal Forces: Causal Clusters vs. Causal 
Chains in International Society,” 176-191. 
13 Ibid. 
 According to Young, it may just be a matter of time before slightly 
less tiny and slightly more significant countries are willing to cede some of their 
sovereignty over to these organizations and institutions. Moreover, John Ikenberry 
points to the rise of China and Greater Asia and he argues that “In the decades to come, 
America’s unipolar power will give way to a more bipolar, multipolar or decentralized 
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distribution of power.”14 He explains how China will most probably become a 
superpower and compete for dominance with the USA, taking us back to a bipolar 
system, which might easily evolve into a multipolar system with the rise of other super 
powers. Ikenberry argues that in order to secure America’s national interest it should 
engage more in building global institutions to facilitate power sharing without conflict. 
What the superpowers should be asking themselves now is: “what sorts of institutional 
arrangements do I want to have in place to protect my interests when I am less 
powerful?” 15
2.5 Case Study: The ICC and the Arrest Warrant of Omar Al Bashir 
Superpowers may still be the chief actors in the international system, but as we 
saw earlier some states are ceding willingly some of their autonomy to important 
institutions such as the ICJ, the UN and the ICC. The Rome Statute established the ICC, 
one of the most essential institutions to put an end to genocide, crimes of war and 
aggression, and crimes against humanity. As the Rome Statute declares, the ICC is: 
 
 
“An international treaty, binding only on those states which formally express 
their consent to be bound by its provisions. These states then become ‘Parties’ to 
the statute. The court is independent and permanent; it has jurisdiction over 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Its jurisdiction is over 
individuals accused of these crimes. This includes those directly responsible for 
committing the crimes as well as others who may be liable for the crimes, for 
example by aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting in the commission of a crime.  
The ICC is a court of last resort.”16
                                                          
14 Ikenberry, “Grand Strategy as Liberal Order Building,” 17. 
15 Roggeveen, “Liberal Institutionalism and its Critics.” 
16 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
 
15 
 
In 2005 a peace agreement was signed that put an end to a twenty-year civil war 
in Sudan. Yet a humanitarian crisis was still taking place in Darfur while the Sudanese 
government failed to protect the civilians in Darfur. The UNSC, alarmed by this crisis, 
and considering it a breach of international peace and security, issued several resolutions 
that were ignored by Sudan. Thus, as a last resort, it decided to refer the case to the ICC 
in order to put an end to the crimes and sufferings taking place in that region, and to 
indict the perpetrators. 
 Sudan did not sign and ratify the Rome Statute of the ICC, and thus is not a 
party state of this international institution. It is thus not required under international law 
to cooperate with the ICC because it is not under its jurisdiction. Cognizant of this, the 
UNSC decided that UNSCR 1593 should be binding per Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
It stated that: 
“The Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, shall 
cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the court and the 
prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing that states not party 
to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the statute, urges all states and 
concerned regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully. The 
Security Council decided to refer the situation prevailing in Darfur since 1 July 
2002 to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.”17
In this case two non-state entities, the UNSC and the ICC, collaborated to give 
the ICC the authority to investigate a national of a non-party state, and the ICC 
prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo was charged to investigate this crime. He secured two 
arrest warrants for two government officials before he was able to collect enough proof 
to accuse Al Bashir, who was eventually found to be implicated in seven grave crimes. 
 
 
                                                          
17 UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005) on Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in Darfur, Sudan. 
16 
 
Al Bashir is compelled to cooperate with the ICC since the UNSC, acting under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, issued resolution 1593 (2005), which referred the case of Darfur 
to the ICC. This Chapter is binding for member states as well as non-members. 
ICC Prosecutor Ocampo, after investigating crimes supposedly committed in the 
territory of Darfur in Sudan, and working with the Pre-trial chamber of the ICC, found 
that there was reason beyond doubt to believe that Al Bashir is guilty of crimes of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The Pre-trial chamber is the entity 
that authorizes the prosecutor to begin or not with an investigation depending on 
whether there are reasonable grounds to proceed with the investigation and that the case 
falls within the jurisdiction of the Court. Subsequently, the prosecutor sees necessary to 
issue a warrant of arrest to appear in Court, he should apply to the Pre-Trial Chamber 
and the latter shall issue one if there is proof beyond doubt that the incumbent has 
committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.18
                                                          
18 Corrie, “Pre-Trial Division of the International Criminal Court: Purpose, Powers, and First Cases,” 3.  
  When the chamber found 
enough grounds to issue an arrest for Al Bashir, it caused great controversy. 
What is noteworthy in this case is the fact that an institution was able to issue an 
arrest warrant to a seated president going beyond the sovereignty of a state. The case of 
Sudan and the ICC is thus interesting because it allows for the possibility of examining 
two overlapping issues: the neorealist vs. the neo-institutionalist debate, but also how the 
rules of the game sometimes change the bargaining power of not only those who 
willingly participate in institutions, but also those who refuse to take part in such a 
framework at the international level.  
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It is important to note that the ICC as an institution does not have universal 
jurisdiction.  The Court may only exercise jurisdiction if: “the accused is a national of a 
State Party or a State otherwise accepting the jurisdiction of the Court; if the crime took 
place on the territory of a state party or a state otherwise accepting the jurisdiction of the 
Court; or if the UNSC has referred the situation to the Prosecutor, irrespective of the 
nationality of the accused or the location of the crime.”19
2.6 ICC vs. Sudan 
 Sudan’s immediate reaction 
was to discredit the prosecutor’s application of an arrest warrant, protesting that it is not 
a member of the Court, and that the latter had no jurisdiction over its territory or 
citizens. Sudan also accused the UNSC of interfering in the national sovereignty of 
Sudan. In addition, the LAS and the AU are asking for diplomatic immunity for Al 
Bashir and are outraged for such breach of state sovereignty. This is clearly a direct 
confrontation between justice and diplomacy, between institutional jurisdiction and state 
sovereignty. Who will win the state or the institution? 
 
According to realists there is no doubt about the state winning this contest. 
Nevertheless the ICC has many international laws and jus cogens on its side. Article IV 
of the Geneva Convention on Genocide states that “Persons committing genocide or any 
of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are 
constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.”20
                                                          
19 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
20 UN Commission on Human Rights, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide. 
 Also article 
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27 of the ICC,21
Skeptics of international law point to the failure of the ICC to prosecute 
Yugoslavia’s Slobodan Milosevic and Augusto Pinochet of Chile, both of whom died or 
were no longer presidents before being convicted of any of the crimes they have 
committed while in office. The ICC has had many other unsuccessful prosecutions of 
former presidents and government officials in the past and this time it is even more 
challenging considering it is the first time the Court is investigating an acting Head of 
State.
 confirms that a chief of state does not have immunity and could be 
subject to a warrant of arrest as well as be arrested and tried. Consequently, the arrest 
warrant applies to a sitting president, and these articles prove that Al Bashir enjoys no 
immunity and has the obligation to go for trial at the Hague. Under Article 89 of the 
Rome Statute,”Al Bashir might also be liable to arrest if he visits one of the 106 states 
that are parties to the treaty”.  Article 89 of the Court’s statute stipulates “the court may 
transit a request for the arrest and surrender of a person [...] to any state on the territory 
of which that person may be found.” 
22 Nonetheless, it is worth noting that Ocampo has undeniable credibility and 
experience. He served as a prosecutor in Argentina between 1984 and 1992: “Mr. 
Moreno-Ocampo was involved in precedent-setting prosecutions of top military 
commanders for mass killings and other large-scale human rights abuses.”23
                                                          
21 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
22 Thomasson, “ICC Prosecutor Seeks Arrest of Sudan's Bashir.” 
23 “Biography of the Prosecutor.” 
 He was the 
assistant prosecutor in the “Military Junta” trial, which involved nine senior 
commanders, including three former heads of state that ruled Argentina between 1976 
and 1983. Five of the accused were convicted on December 8, 1985. Ocampo has never 
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been refused an arrest warrant in the previous eleven applications at The Hague.24
From a neorealist point of view, the arrest warrant of Al Bashir stands a slim 
chance of being carried out especially that Sudan is not cooperating. A neo-realist 
analysis would look at power politics and deduce that the government of Khartoum is 
backed by two very powerful states, namely China and Russia. China is “Khartoum’s 
biggest arms supplier and a major investor in its oil industry,”
 
Furthermore, and after a request from the prosecutor, the Pre-Trial chamber is 
reconsidering to add the charge of genocide to the seven other grave crimes that Al 
Bashir is being indicted for. 
25
The warrant also poses some other concerns in regard to those sustaining 
contacts with Al Bashir. The latter did not participate in the General Assembly meeting 
 as is Russia. Both 
countries are permanent members and hold veto power and can use it against any 
decision that the UNSC might enforce.   
From the perspective of neo-institutionalists, the ICC’s investigation was 
instigated by a Chapter VII UNSCR, which was delegated by the five permanent 
members and the international system at large. The Court of course is only and strictly 
interested in carrying out its duties; prosecuting crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. The ICC has found reason beyond doubt to accuse Al Bashir 
for such crimes, and that sooner or later Al Bashir will be tried even if he does not 
present himself at The Hague. The sole concern is to bring justice to the people of 
Sudan.  
                                                          
24 Al Jazeera and Agencies, “Sudan President Accused of Genocide.” 
25 “Biography of the Prosecutor.” 
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that was held in New York on September 15, 2009. He was not invited to the Islamic 
Summit that took place in Istanbul, Turkey on November 9, 2009. The ICC warrant has 
already disrupted his relations with the European Union (EU), Turkey and the USA and 
may affect Sudan’s relations with China and Russia.26 In other words, it might be true 
that Al Bashir still enjoys his freedom, however the ICC’s arrest warrant already 
managed to disrupt his ‘safe haven’ in many ways. Unfortunately, international 
institutions are often viewed as yet another way for superpowers to expand their 
hegemony and/or promote democracy by force. To many, like the LAS and the AU, the 
ICC is viewed as an institution designed to dictate to other countries how to run their 
affairs; hence to many the ICC is a neo-imperialist institution.27
Institutionalists can neutralize these charges by defining the institutions they 
want to build with a very strict set of laws that establish clearly their jurisdiction, leaving 
little room for interpretation as possible. “These proposed institutions must never 
be purposive in character like the NATO for instance. The NATO is an obvious example 
of a purposive institution, in that it was established with the specific aim of defending 
Western Europe from the Warsaw Pact and these institutions work best in very similar 
cultural environments and not on a global scale. Institutions should rather be 
procedural.”
 Ikenberry explains that 
there is a solution to these anti-imperialist concerns.  
28
                                                          
26 BBC News, “World Reaction: Bashir Warrant.”, May 13, 2010. 
27 Ikenberry, “Grand Strategy as Liberal Order Building,” 11. 
28 Roggeveen, “Liberal Institutionalism and its Critics.” 
 In Ikenberry’s opinion, institutions should not have a defined goal; rather, 
they should be a friendly environment that allows member states to reach resolution of 
certain problems providing an environment that facilitates cooperation between states. 
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The Bretton Woods accords are a good example of this type of procedural category, as 
well as a body of international law such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
Ikenberry suggests that building procedural institutions will protect states from 
disagreements over who defines the purpose of the institution and what its hidden 
agendas are. In turn, this will create more trust in the utility of international institutions. 
The ICC has been put in a situation in which it has to make double the effort now to 
clarify that it was established as an institution to prosecute those who commit crimes of 
war and aggression and genocide in order to protect innocent people with no other 
ulterior motives. The first review conference for the ICC, is taking place in Kampala, 
Uganda between May 31st and June 11, 2010 opening the opportunity to the State Parties 
to amend the Rome Statute and extending its jurisdiction to crimes of aggression that is 
yet to be defined.29
2.7 Conclusion 
  
 
Institutions do not have ulterior motives, states do. Some suggest that states 
control institutions; however others insist that institutions shape the preferences of states 
no matter how powerful those states are. It is a fact that independent institutions are 
struggling today in a world dominated by national, economical, and military interests 
over human rights protection and international justice. It is also a fact that more and 
more institutions are being created, and more and more states are willing to join them. 
Institutions are growing and most importantly they are eroding the false belief that 
                                                          
29 BBC News, “Why ICC needs more than time”, June 5, 2010. 
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political leaders have immunity and are protected by the sovereignty of their state. 
International institutions are succeeding in limiting the immunity of those who want to 
violate international norms and procedures. Institutionalism is not yet condemned to 
failure, as Mearsheimer predestined in The False Promise of International Institutions, 
rather it continues to evolve in scope and ability in a new era of international politics.  
As President Bill Clinton boldly declared in 1992, “in a world where freedom, not 
tyranny, is on the march, the cynical calculus of pure power politics simply does not 
compute. It is ill-suited to a new era.”30
                                                          
30 “THE 1992 CAMPAIGN; Excerpts From Speech By Clinton on U.S. Role.” 
 The next chapter provides a historical overview 
of Sudan’s politics in which it focuses on Al Bashir’s rule since he took power by force 
in 1989 leading the country through a twenty year long civil war that some believe is 
still ongoing.    
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Chapter 3  
 
Situating the ICC in the Context of the Conflict 
in Sudan 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter identifies the key players, the major peace agreements that put an 
end to more than twenty years of civil war and the atrocities that were committed during 
that period. It also examines major UNSC Resolutions that were issued, as Sudan was 
becoming a threat to international peace and security. In order to understand the 
importance of the role of the ICC and international justice in the case of Sudan and Al 
Bashir’s indictment, we must first analyze the Sudanese conflict with its various political 
parties and actors. This chapter examines how the Darfur case was transferred by the 
UNSC to the ICC. And what are the repercussions that this indictment had on the region, 
taking mainly the AU and LAS’ response towards the indictment? 
 
3.2 A History of Conflict 
Sudan’s history is that of coup d’états, conflict between the North and the South 
as well as in Darfur. It is an ethnic conflict at the surface but in reality a conflict over 
power and resource sharing. Despite the many attempts, the difficulty of reaching a 
peace agreement is without a doubt a challenge.  
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In 1924 the British colonialists separated the country into two administrations 
and instituted policies forbidding the population of the south, which was predominantly 
Christian and Animist, to move north and the people of the north, who were 
predominantly Arab and Muslim, to move south. After Sudan took its independence in 
1956, the separation led to the development of the Islamic North and furthered the 
isolation of the Christian South that did not want to be dominated by the North.  
Sudan was immersed in civil wars even before it gained its independence. 
Fighting between the Arab Muslim North and the Christian Animist South rarely left the 
country in peace. Controlled by Muslim Arabs, Khartoum’s government always sought 
to gain control over the oil rich Christian Animist South. It imposed Islamic Sharia Law 
and wanted to turn Sudan, including the South, into federal states. The latter rebelled and 
formed the South Sudanese People’s Liberation Army or Movement (SPLA/SPLM) led 
by John Garang de Mabior.31
The SPLA/M was fighting for a united but improved Sudan, with equal 
democratic rights for the entire country. They called for ‘liberation’, a new democratic 
government, a solution for the national and religious sensitivities, for secularism, 
federal-style regionalism, an end to the monopoly over power by Khartoum, balanced 
economic development in remote regions, a campaign against racism, tribalism, and 
sectarianism, and, most importantly, a freer economy not monopolized by the state.
 
32 On 
the other hand, a new vision was also gaining popularity in the North, promoting “a new 
society to arise from the corruption of the old.”33
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32 Bechtold, Politics in the Sudan, 294. 
33 Burr, Revolutionary Sudan, 55. 
 It materialized in June 1989, when the 
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Islamist leader of the National Islamic Front (NIF) Hassan Al-Turabi and Brigadier Al 
Bashir performed a bloodless military coup d’état resulting in Al Bashir taking the 
Presidency of Sudan and Al-Turabi appointed as Speaker of the National Assembly or 
Parliament. 
Political opposition was suppressed by this new regime, and all attempts to 
democratize were soon revealed to be futile. Lack of trust and confidence in the 
government’s intentions increased, and it soon became clear that the Khartoum 
government wanted to strengthen its power in the North. This led to deterioration in the 
country. In fact, the ruling elite cared only for preserving its own privileges and interests 
and continued the war with the SPLA. It declared Jihad against the non-Muslim South, 
which caused the already suffering population from torture, displacement, genocide, and 
starvation, to grow even more distant, distrusting, and hopeless. 
The SPLA started to weaken in 1991, when serious intra-ethnic fighting broke 
because of an important divide within its own ranks. The Marxist regime of Mengistu 
Haile Mariam, in Ethiopia, a key regional ally of the SPLA fell at the same time, 
weakening the latter further. The SPLA survived through a series of coalition with 
opposition movements from the north as well as regional support. The North’s power 
declined as well, when in December 1999, Al-Turabi challenged Al Bashir by trying to 
give a bigger role to the prime minister and parliament.  
Al-Turabi assumed that he could allow the governors of the twenty-six federal 
states of Sudan to be directly elected, against the common practice of appointing them 
by the president. In addition, the prime minister would have to report to parliament 
26 
 
instead of the President, hence curtailing presidential powers even more.34 Feeling that 
his presidency and authority were being threatened, Al Bashir, still favoring the military 
approach, resorted to force. The latter was not ready to surrender to Al-Turabi or be 
marginalized by the National Congress who personified the Islamist state. Yet he could 
not do much legally to avert or hinder Al-Turabi’s governmental challenge. 
Consequently, Al Bashir dismissed Al-Turabi and dissolved the assembly. On December 
12, 1999, he ordered army tanks to besiege the legislative building two days prior to the 
National Assembly’s vote on curbing the powers of the presidency.35
 When Al Bashir felt threatened by Al-Turabi he took power from him by force 
dismissing any democratic procedures. Consequently, the National Islamic Front was 
divided into the National Congress Party (NCP), which was the ruling party at the time 
and the Popular National Congress (PNC), which was founded by Al-Turabi, 
subsequently, in August 2000 “to recover the Islamist momentum that he and his allies 
had achieved over the past decade.”
 Al Bashir declared 
a state of emergency, called for new elections to the National Assembly in December 
2000, and suspended parts of the constitution. Since February 2001, Al-Turabi was in 
and out of jail for signing a memorandum of understanding with the SPLA, or arrested 
and charged of being a threat to national security and the constitutional order. 
36
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36 Ibid., 272. 
 Then Al Bashir, acting as President, appointed 
state governors and ministers for the twenty six states; some of these governors were 
non-Muslim Southern Sudanese politicians but all of the latter were economically 
dependent on the government of Khartoum. In December 2000, Al Bashir held 
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presidential and legislative elections in order to reaffirm his legitimacy. He was 
reelected with “86.5 percent of the vote and his party, the now ruling National Congress 
Party, won 355 of 360 seats in the National Assembly.”37
Frustration grew as health services were lacking. The education sector was 
neglected as well. There were no job opportunities and the infrastructure was left 
undeveloped. It was only in 2002 that the Machakos Protocol “granted the south the 
right to a referendum on self-determination following a six-year interim period and 
dictated that Sharia law would remain in force only in the north.”
 These figures were far from 
being representative of the will of the people of Sudan because the main opposition 
parties boycotted them and most of the south was not able to vote.  
38 Talks were supposed 
to continue on sharing power and wealth, on human rights, and a ceasefire was to be 
announced to set a framework for future successful negotiations.39 But the parties left 
two basic historical and political inheritances unsettled in the composition of 
postcolonial Sudan: “The legacy of the radicalized state of the North and the 
ethnicization of Southern Sudan, increasing the possibility for renewed political violence 
from within and without.”40
The country was now in war along racial, religious, ethnic, tribal, and regional 
grounds. Foreign aid was becoming scarce as well, because it was difficult to justify aid 
to a regime “perceived increasingly as persecuting its southern minority, harboring 
 Consequently, the war went on; it affected every part of the 
country and every sector.  
                                                          
37 Hoile and European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council, The Search for Peace in the Sudan : A 
Chronology of the Sudanese Peace Process 1989-2001, 312. 
38 The Government of Sudan and The Sudan People's Liberation Movement, Machakos Protocol. 
39 “The Enough Project.” 
40 Idris, Conflict and Politics of Identity in Sudan, 92. 
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terrorists like Osama Bin Laden,”41 and implicated in the attempted assassination of 
Hosni Mubarak. Obstruction of aid deliveries like food and medicine was a daily 
occurrence. Massacres in the South were taking place while the authorities stood still. 
Slavery among the refugees reappeared caused by poverty, displacement and exodus. 
The Sudanese government and army were regularly accused of perpetrating these 
atrocities.42
The NCP and the SPLM continued talks under heavy pressure from the USA. 
The main issues being negotiated were issues of “identity, power and wealth sharing, 
and the future of the three contested regions of the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, and 
Southern Kordofan.”
  
43 While the two parties negotiated, a new civil war was ignited in 
Darfur allowing the Government of Sudan (GoS) to delay reaching a peace agreement. It 
was only in early 2004 that these parties started making some progress. Finally, on 
January 9, 2005 the peace was officially signed by both sides in the so-called 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in which all parties agreed to put an end to 
Sudan’s civil war that lasted for more than 20 years.44
                                                          
41 Anderson, Sudan in Crisis, 235. 
42 Ibid., 49. 
43 Idris, Conflict and Politics of Identity in Sudan, 77. 
44 The Government of Sudan and The Sudan People's Liberation Movement, The Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement. 
 The South became an independent 
area that included ten governorates, with Juba as the capital. John Garang, as leader of 
the SPLA/M, was appointed co-vice President and President of the South. He died 
shortly in a suspicious helicopter crash. General Salva Kiir Mayardit became the 
President of the South of Sudan. The agreement gave the South of Sudan the chance to 
enjoy autonomy by setting up a separate administration for a transitional period of six 
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years. It was supposed to be followed by a referendum, which would determine the 
South’s independence from the North.   
The agreement also established an interim National Unity Government (NUG) 
with a power-sharing arrangement. Both parties, the North and South, agreed to divide 
oil revenues equally although most of Sudan’s oil is in the south, and created a co-vice 
president position.45 However, after the death of John Garang, the NCP started delaying 
and stalling, and damaging every chance for the CPA to be implemented. It did so by 
delaying the elections that were mandated by the agreement. It did not release the funds 
for the census, nor did it define the boundaries between North and South, which are 
essential in order to have electoral districts. Moreover, the NCP military forces did not 
relinquish the Southern oil fields contrary to the timetable agreed upon in the CPA.46
 
  
The CPA failed to put in place a disarmament mechanism and thus both the 
North and South's armies remained in place allowing the possibility of new clashes and 
the fear factor to remain. Because of tribal rivalries and ethnic divisions, Darfur was 
unable to form a unified political front. The CPA had failed to address these problems 
and left Darfur’s issue out of the CPA lest it jeopardizes the agreement. Consequently, 
in February 2003, rebel groups, such as the SLA/M and the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM), backed by Chad were left with no choice but to launch attacks on 
the government’s army. Their cause was primarily political and was linked to the poor 
governance of the central government, which historically and politically marginalized 
Darfur. The violence broke soon after. 
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3.3 The Conflict in Darfur 
Darfur had been accumulating the consequences of isolation since British 
colonial rule. Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, discontent grew and rebel groups 
started rallying up in order to settle the many local grievances and disputes, particularly 
over land rights and greater autonomy. Also, on the economic level, Darfur was always 
cast aside from the state’s structure and from the decision making process. The 
government, in turn, blamed Darfur’s condition on desertification and the lack of 
resources due to tribal conflicts. Indeed, the government played on fears, identity 
differences and traditional critical grievances; it manipulated the ethnic divisions of the 
region to deflect the political issues raised by the rebels. This drove the rebels to 
organize as one opposition front.47
As a result, the GoS tried to break up the Darfur front into tribal clusters in order 
to limit the legitimacy of the opposition and their demands.
 Darfur was marginalized and the Khartoum 
government had control over its main resources, namely oil, which Sudan’s economy 
relied on. The government did not allow the middle class to flourish, marginalized a big 
portion of the population, giving them choice but to take arms.  
48
                                                          
47 Ibid., 78. 
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 The GoS armed 
communities and tribes selectively to fight against one another, and sent troops to 
Darfur in order to weaken the rebels’ role in the fighting. Most importantly, they armed 
the so-called Janjaweed, an Arab militia, to repress the rebels and ended up 
perpetrating the most disastrous and massive genocide, “the worst humanitarian crisis 
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in the world as described by the UN.”49 200,000 people were estimated killed in 
Darfur.50
Had the parties included the Darfur conflict in the CPA, this humanitarian crisis 
could have been avoided. The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed only after 
the tragic humanitarian atrocities took place. On May 5, 2006, the DPA, mediated by 
the AU, was signed by the GoS, however not all rebel groups were represented. Only 
one faction of the SLA led by Commander Minni Arkou Minnawi signed the deal. This 
peace process relied on two phases: the first phase called for an agreement after the 
disarmament of the Janjaweed militia as well as the rebel groups in order to integrate 
them into the army, the second phase was the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation 
(DDD-C), a comprehensive process to extend the agreement to other political players 
and communities in order to deal more directly with the core issues of the conflict in 
Darfur such as power-sharing, land tenure and civil rights.
 Satellite pictures show entire villages burnt and destroyed. Many more 
civilians still live in dreadful conditions. They are tortured, raped and displaced.  
51
The initial agreement was only accepted by one faction of a rebel group out of 
three other main players, thus lacking legitimacy and support on the ground. Although 
this peace agreement called for the disarmament of the Janjaweed and the rebel groups, 
it was doomed to failure because the rest of the non-signatory rebel groups continued to 
fight and considered the Minni Minnawi faction as government collaborators. This lack 
of representation ignited another mutiny on October 14, 2006, this time in the East of 
Sudan in the states of Red Sea and Kassala, led by a coalition of rebel groups, the 
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SPLA and the JEM joining at a later stage.52
3.4 The Referendum and its Implications  
 The latter demanded to have more power 
in the Southern Sudan agreement through better representation in the national 
government formation. They also opposed what they considered to be an unfair oil 
distribution. This latter issue is supposed to be addressed in the referendum that will 
take place in 2011. The CPA committed the North and the South to a referendum, 
which will give the South the right to vote to secede and become independent of the 
North. 
 
 Any referendum on the future of the South has many implications that 
will affect the economy of Sudan and especially the North. Sudan’s economy relies on 
countries such as China, Russia, Malaysia, India, France, Japan and Kuwait and their 
foreign-based oil drilling companies that have substantial investments in Sudan.53
 
 A 
clear majority in the South wants to secede from Sudan. If and when the South 
becomes sovereign it will then revoke any oil contracts made with Khartoum. In other 
words, if secession takes place and if oil contracts are revoked the losing parties are 
going to be China, Russia, Malaysia, India, France, Japan and Kuwait. Secession, also 
threatens directly the core economic interests of the North. In order to stall the 
implementation of the CPA, the GoS manipulates the tribes to camouflage its 
unwillingness to share power and wealth with the South. 
                                                          
52 Ibid., 86. 
53 Tønnesson and Kolas, “Energy Security in Asia: China, India, Oil and Peace.” 
33 
 
3.5 The Role of the UN Security Council  
The UN was an important proponent of the CPA. Originally the NCP was not 
able to defeat the SPLA. The USA started to put intense pressure on Sudanese officials 
using several techniques. The UNSC was one of the ways to pressure Sudan into 
signing the peace deal. Many resolutions were passed, like the June 2004 UNSCR 
1574, which mandated the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS) to 
facilitate peace talks and arrange contacts with the concerned parties.54 UNSCR 1556 
was passed shortly thereafter, in July 2004 assigning more tasks to UNAMIS given the 
deteriorating situation in Darfur.55 Simultaneously, the UNSC imposed a strict arms 
embargo on all non-governmental units and individuals, especially the Janjaweed 
operating in Darfur. UNSCR 1564 followed a month later. It noted that there was no 
progress in the security situation that civilians were still living in fear, that no action 
was being taken towards disarming the Janjaweed militias, and underscored the 
deliberate violation of international humanitarian law in Darfur.56
Unable to punish criminals, the UNSC decided to refer the lawless situation in 
Darfur to the ICC in Resolution 1593.
  
57
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 Ocampo was the prosecutor appointed to study 
the Darfur case. He started by issuing two warrants of arrest asking the Minister of 
State for the Interior of the Government of Sudan Ahmad Muhammad Harun (Ahmad 
Harun) and a Popular Defence Force (PDF) member and a senior Militia/Janjaweed 
leader Ali Muhammad Al Abd-Al-Rahman (Ali Kushayb) to appear before the ICC. 
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After that, he accused Al Bashir of involvement in crimes of war among seven other 
grave crimes. He was accused of giving his forces to eliminate three ethnic groups the 
Fur, the Masalit and the Zaghawa himself.58 With the backing of the UNSC, which 
classified the situation in Sudan as a threat to international peace and security, the ICC 
set a precedent by indicting a seated president, a national of a non-state party to the 
Rome statute and who yet has the obligation to go to trial under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the UN. This Resolution indirectly imposed on the GoS the duty to facilitate 
the arrest for those accused of crimes against humanity, as well as war crimes. 
However none of the indicted persons showed up for trial, neither the former Interior 
Minister nor the current Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs, Ahmad Harun, and 
Janjaweed commander Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman.59 Ocampo pressed the 
pre-trial chamber to charge Al Bashir with Genocide. The ICC is currently reviewing 
their previous ruling in order to re-examine whether to add the allegation of genocide to 
Al Bashir’s charge sheet.60
International and regional actors as well as the UN tried to press the NCP and 
the SPLM to sign the CPA. Consequently, the UN issued more resolutions. In 2005, 
UNSCR 1591 was adopted in order to strengthen the arms embargo, to ban travel, to 
freeze the assets of rebel leaders as well as government officials.
   
61 These resolutions 
opened the way for the regional mediation team of the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD),62
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 and the troika formed of the United Kingdom (UK), Norway, 
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and Italy, to broker a peace deal. The CPA gave the South of Sudan the chance to enjoy 
autonomy by setting up a separate administration for a transitional period of six years, 
which will be followed by the referendum in 2011.  
The military forces of the NCP are still present in the Southern oil fields 
contrary to the timetable agreed upon in the CPA. This agreement failed to put in place 
a disarmament mechanism and thus both the North and South armies remained in place 
allowing for the possibility of new clashes. People are wary of another civil war 
especially that the situation in the South is deteriorating. It seems now almost certain 
that the South is going to vote to secede from the North, which means Sudan will 
become two separate states, with two independent economies. If the South decides to 
secede, the North is going to have to let go of its control over oil. Oil has been the main 
source of revenue for the government of Khartoum. This might create some more 
tension between the North and South elevating the risk of falling back into another civil 
war. 
 
3.6 The Role of Oil in the Conflict  
 Today, the risk of another all out civil war is real. However there are three main 
peace agreements: the 2004 Abyei Protocol, the 2005 CPA, and the 2006 DPA that 
have been signed and are ensuring the continuity of the current status quo. These three 
main agreements are supported, as I have mentioned, by many; the UNSC, by national 
parties, as well as regional and international actors. Yet clashes and tensions are still 
rising, the displaced still cannot return to their villages and homes are still destroyed. 
However, while the USA, the UK, the EU, as well as other major international actors 
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are endorsing any actions taken by the Khartoum government that is bringing the 
country closer to peace, others are working in the opposite direction. Some 
international actors are working against the peace process: “In a report from the Human 
Rights First (HRF) organization a claim states that 90% of the light weapons currently 
being imported by Sudan and used in the conflict are sold by China.”63
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 Oil is the main source of revenue for the Sudanese government of Al Bashir. It 
is from these profits that Al Bashir is accused of buying weapons and fueling the 
conflict. Consequently, the Sudanese oil importers such as India, Russia and Japan are 
accused of supporting the economy of the government of Al Bashir, while the latter 
continues to obstruct the CPA. Al Bashir’s government is undermining the reforms 
critical to the development of the South. His party is politically manipulating the 
situation repeating the bait-and-switch routine of making unfulfilled promises in order 
to cut out international pressure, as well as weaken Salva Kiir’s efforts. It perceives the 
referendum as a threat to its regime survival. Their unwillingness to implement the 
CPA risks a return to war. 
 There is no doubt that implementing the peace agreements would change the 
current political, economic, and social status of the country. Peace agreements have 
been signed. They pledged responsibility from all the Sudanese parties involved the 
people, and the international community. Some are working for the realization of this 
peace, others are working against it. Strategies, rehabilitation programs, disarmament, 
and reintegration are necessary steps for Sudan to take and make sure that it does not 
relive another civil war. 
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 So far what appears to be a national consensus for peace in Sudan has revealed 
to be a tactic used by Al Bashir and his party to divert the attention of the international 
community and to silence the rebellion in his country. It is clear now that the continued 
conflicts in Sudan are mainly a result of a one track military solution that the NCP and 
the Government of Khartoum are following instead of channeling their efforts towards 
democratic transitions and the implementation of the CPA and the rest of the peace 
protocols. 
 The difficulty in this conflict stems from the vast power asymmetries between 
the two parties. The high power party (NCP) does not believe that a positive outcome 
would result from engaging in a resolution and reconciliation process and the low 
power party (SPLA/M) does not have the power to enforce their conditions on the 
process or negotiation. Each side has its own narratives. Al Bashir’s party feels that 
their power base is threatened and as such creates narratives to justify their behaviors, 
while perpetrating some of the most atrocious human rights injustices in modern 
history. And while the Darfuris and the people of the South suffer from genocide, 
displacement, hunger and instability, they launched a resistance movement that is now 
a form of power in itself because they refuse to accept the status quo they are living in. 
In order to have a successful conflict resolution and eventual reconciliation, all parties 
must be equitable during negotiations. Unfortunately, the peace agreements that were 
signed were lacking justice and fairness and were guided solely by the concern to stop 
the war, in other words conflict settlement, which does not really address the social 
disparities or the root causes of this protracted civil war. The CPA was only led by the 
power relations between the parties involved. 
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 In a keynote address to the International Crisis Group/Save Darfur 
Coalition/European Policy Centre Conference, the President of International Crisis 
Group, Gareth Evans, noted that: 
“It is time for Sudan to rejoin the community of nations respected for their 
commitment to the highest standard and values, and for the international 
community, once and for all and without further excuses of its own – and with 
the EU and its key member states playing a leading role - to act decisively and 
effectively to persuade it to do so.”64
“The US administration has worked hard to end Sudan’s long running civil 
conflict. But this effort will have been wasted if we allow the Sudanese 
government to continue committing crimes against humanity. Not only will the 
international community have blood on its hand for failure to halt genocide, but 
we will have demonstrated to Khartoum that it can continue to act with impunity 
against its own people. In that case, any hard-won peace agreement will not be 
worth the paper its’ signed on.”
 
 
Putting pressure on Khartoum to implement and fulfill the agreements it has signed is 
the only way to avoid the failure of the CPA, also holding accountable the people 
responsible for all the atrocities deters criminals from committing more violations. As 
Susan Rice and Gayle Smith argued in the Washington Post on May 30, 2004:  
65
3.7 ICC Indictment and its Repercussions  
 
 
 
Not only members of the international community like China, Russia, the US, 
the UK, and the EU are involved in the case of Sudan, but also the ICC indictment of 
Al Bashir drew the attention of important regional actors such as the LAS and the AU. 
All Arab and most African states are backing Sudan and refuse to extradite Al Bashir.  
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For Sudan facing justice involves paying a high price for all the damage that has 
been done over the past twenty years; millions are displaced and millions of villages 
and homes were destroyed. The perpetrators, as well as their supporters, are not ready 
to neither make concessions nor comply with the law.  The AU Assembly, for instance 
decided:  
“Not to cooperate with the ICC pursuant to the provisions of Article 98 of the 
Rome Statute relating to immunities for the arrest and surrender of President 
Omar Al Bashir of The Sudan is a logical consequence of the stated position of 
the AU on the manner in which the prosecution against President Bashir has been 
conducted, the publicity-seeking approach of the ICC Prosecutor, the refusal by 
the UN Security Council to address the request made by the African Union and 
other important International groupings for deferment of the indictment against 
President Bashir of The Sudan, under Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the 
ICC.”66
2) “Testimony to the glaring reality that the situation in Darfur is too serious and 
complex an issue to be resolved without recourse to a harmonized approach to 
justice and peace, neither of which should be pursued at the expense of the other. 
“Furthermore, the decision was taken after due evaluation of the situation in 
Darfur informed by the commitment of Member States to finding a lasting 
solution to the problem in Darfur with a view to restoring peace, security and 
stability in The Sudan and the whole region and prevent further displacement and 
killings in that country. And one more decision worth noting is the request: 3) 
upon the United Nations Security Council to seriously consider the request by 
the AU for the deferral of the process initiated by the ICC, in accordance with 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute.”
 
 
Nonetheless, as we have seen in the previous chapter the ICC is very aware of this 
limitation and is not trying to arrest Al Bashir by force; it simply found enough proof to 
indict him. Getting him to the Hague would be ideal but considering the circumstances, 
it can go ahead with the prosecution without him being there in person.  
 The AU also decided that:  
67
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On its part, and fearful lest Sudan’s case set an objectionable precedent, the LAS 
decided to condemn the arrest warrant of Al Bashir. It reassured Sudan that it will 
support it in facing any further indictments that targets its sovereignty, its union, and its 
stability. It also stated that Sudan has the primary right to investigate matters of justice 
and rejects any attempts to politicize international law and apply it to undermine the 
sovereignty and stability of Sudan. 
 The LAS also underscored its position that presidents of states have immunity 
that was granted to them along with diplomatic privileges in the Vienna convention on 
Diplomatic relations year 1961. Article 29 of the convention states: “The person of a 
diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or 
detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due respect and shall take all 
appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity.”68
1) “The immunity from jurisdiction of diplomatic agents and of persons 
enjoying immunity under article 37 may be waived by the sending State. 
2) Waiver must always be express. 3) The initiation of proceedings by a 
diplomatic agent or by a person enjoying immunity from jurisdiction 
under article 37 shall preclude him from invoking immunity from 
jurisdiction in respect of any counterclaim directly connected with the 
principal claim. 4) Waiver of immunity from jurisdiction in respect of 
civil or administrative proceedings shall not be held to imply waiver of 
immunity in respect of the execution of the judgment, for which a 
separate waiver shall be necessary.”
 On the 
other hand, Article 32 clearly states that:  
69
The LAS also stated that the ICC indictment puts major obstacles in front of efforts 
exerted to reach a sustainable peace in Sudan. The LAS also argued that the indictment 
complicated preparations underway for the upcoming presidential and parliamentary 
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elections of April 2010. It requested the UNSC to take action in order to maintain civil 
peace and stability in Sudan. 
The UNSC did take action by issuing a resolution under Chapter VII because it 
perceived that not only civil peace in Sudan was threatened but also international peace 
and stability. It is important to mention that the latter did not indict Al Bashir nor 
mentioned his name in the Resolution 1593. It only referred the case of Darfur to the 
ICC. 
The Sudanese government is against the ICC indictments and is refusing to 
comply with it; it is protesting and mobilizing people against it. Moreover, the 
Sudanese government is using the media to discredit the ICC and to blame the USA of 
orchestrating the ICC indictment. As one commentator has noted, “The Sudanese 
government uses the local media, including television and newspapers, to tell the 
people what it wants them to believe about the court, according to Hashim Ahmed, 
director of Sudan Organization against Torture.”70 The government in Khartoum is also 
spreading rumors, suggesting that the international community is using the ICC to try 
to invade Sudan, and that the ICC has no jurisdiction in Sudan, conveniently omitting 
any mention of how the UNSC empowered the ICC with the jurisdiction through a 
Chapter VII resolution. Above and beyond, there is a major misunderstanding and lack 
of information about what the court does: “Rumors circulate about how it operates and 
what impact it will have. Sometimes, even those people who support the court don't 
understand it, and spread wrong information with the best of intentions, said Ali.”71
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The reason is mainly because the people are only getting information from one source, 
namely the government. 
 In spite of government censorship, observers believe that attempts to 
raise awareness about the ICC are advancing, claiming that most people know about 
the court and support it, even if they do not understand all its details. “Ahmed said 
people want the ICC to try those responsible for crimes committed. People know the 
Sudanese judiciary is [in the hands of the] government and not capable or impartial, he 
said. It’s why the ICC should come in. People know the injustices being done.”72
3.8 Conclusion 
In order to reach a sustainable peace social, structural changes are necessary. 
There are different processes in resolving ethnic conflicts and bringing justice to people 
is one of these processes. The ICC is playing an important role in this conflict. The 
international community should take a more pro-active role and a commitment to 
sustain the needed pressure on Al Bashir’s regime to fulfill the requirements of the 
Peace Agreements. The government of Sudan must be pressured to abide by the ICC 
indictments. If those indictments are not well founded as Al Bashir claims, why oppose 
a fair trial to take place for the two government officials that the prosecutor indicted as 
well as Al Bashir himself. 
 
 
 These are the forces of transition and accountability measures that should 
be taken. It is the only way Sudan will ever get its conflict resolution and 
reconciliation. People must get justice in order to reconcile and have a lasting peace 
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with no vendettas and tensions rising up again every time a disagreement happens. It is 
only when the criminals who perpetrated all the crimes in Darfur and Sudan in general 
are held accountable that the people will feel safe. Once a safer and more secure 
environment is established, once the displaced and the refugees resettle and once there 
are no armed groups terrorizing civilians, only then can free and fair elections take 
place, unlike the ones that took place on April 2010.  
  Is the situation ripe enough to bring about justice? Justice demands a 
great social change for the greater good and that depends very much on the context of 
the conflict. The people of Sudan are still misinformed and confused about the 
legitimacy of the ICC over their nationals. The next chapter discusses the legality of the 
ICC’s jurisdiction over Al Bashir.  
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Chapter 4 
The Prosecution of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir: 
Legal or not? 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The ICC does not have jurisdiction over States, but only over individuals, 
particularly the nationals of party states. However, when international peace and 
security is breached there are certain exceptions, in which the Court can extend its 
jurisdiction. This chapter examines those exceptions, and analyzes the difference in the 
Court’s jurisdiction over nationals of party states as well as non-party states. 
 Different aspects of the case against Al Bashir are examined: a) Sudan is 
not a party state to the ICC and Al Bashir is its president. How then can the ICC have 
jurisdiction over him? Moreover what are the implications of Chapter VII resolution 
1593, which referred this case to the ICC?  Consequently this chapter poses a number 
of questions: what changes in the authority of the ICC over nationals of non-party 
states when a prosecution is mandated under a Chapter VII resolution of the UN 
Charter? Why is the difference between prosecuting nationals of ICC party states and 
the nationals of non-party state blurred when the SC refers a case to the ICC? What 
happens to the immunity of government officials and heads of states? This chapter 
demonstrates that there is no such immunity before international law, when the Geneva 
Convention article IV and Article 27 of the Rome Statute are considered. 
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4.2 The ICC and the Rome Statute  
 Chapter VII of the UN Charter rules above most international laws and a 
resolution issued under it is considered very authoritative. Nonetheless many 
limitations remain to be challenged in the Statute and the ICC’s jurisdiction. The Rome 
Statute is an international treaty that defines the preconditions of the Court’s 
jurisdiction over persons charged with the gravest crimes of international concern, the 
elements of its jurisdiction, its functions as well as its limitations. The following is a 
summary of these preconditions and limitations: Article 5 defines the crimes, which the 
Court is authorized to look into. It is limited to the gravest crimes such as the crime of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, crime of aggression.73
“In the case of Article 13
 Articles 6, 7, and 
8 define each one of these crimes and what constitutes them. On the other hand Article 
12 of the Statute sets the preconditions for the Court to exercise its jurisdiction.  
“When a State signs the Statute, it accepts the jurisdiction of the Court and the 
crimes referred to in article 5: 
74
3. If the acceptance of a State, which is not a Party to this Statute, is required 
under paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, 
accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in 
, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise its 
jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Parties to this Statute or 
have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3:  
 
a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the 
crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of 
that vessel or aircraft; 
b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national. 
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question. The accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without any delay or 
exception in accordance with Part 9.”75
 
 
These are the conditions required in order for the Court to have jurisdiction over the 
national of a state. However, the following section explains the prosecution of a 
national of a non-party state. 
 
4.3 Prosecuting a National of a Non-Party State: The Arrest Warrant 
of Al Bashir 
 The ICC is the first permanent criminal Court in the world. It came into effect 
on July 1, 2002 when sixty states accepted, entered or ratified the treaty and thus 
became ‘Parties’ to the Statute. Today, after several years of negotiations and 
opposition from various states, especially the USA, 111 states have joined the ICC. As 
the article of the statute indicates, the ICC has jurisdiction only over the nationals of 
party states i.e. the states that have signed or ratified its statute. However, there are 
certain exceptions to this rule as we saw in article 12 (3) as well as in other articles.  
 Al Bashir was accused by the ICC prosecutor of genocide per the Rome Statute, 
under Article 6, and of: 
“(a) Killing members of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups (also 
referred to as ‘target groups’), (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of those groups, and (c) deliberately inflicting on those groups 
conditions of life calculated to bring about their physical destruction in part; of 
crimes against humanity under Article 7 (1) of the Statute, committed as part of a 
widespread and systematic attack directed against the civilian population of 
Darfur with knowledge of the attack, the acts of (a) murder, (b) extermination, 
                                                          
75 Ibid. 
47 
 
(c) forcible transfer of the population, (d) torture, and (e) rapes; and of war 
crimes under Article 8 (2)(e)(i) of the Statute, for intentionally directing attacks 
against the civilian population as such, and (v) pillaging a town or place.”76
“1. The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this 
Statute. 
 
 
In this case the Prosecutor is not stating that Al Bashir perpetrated these crimes himself 
or directly, but is charging him of responsibility for giving the orders and orchestrating 
those crimes through the instruments of the state of Sudan, namely the army and the 
Militia/Janjaweed. It is clearly stated in article 25 (3) (a) of the Statute that the Court 
has the authority to indict persons even if they have not conducted a crime directly: 
2. A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be 
individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this 
Statute. 
3. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and 
liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that 
person: (a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another 
or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally 
responsible.”77
 
  
Sudan did not sign the ICC statute. Thus Sudan is not a ‘Party State’, which 
makes the arrest warrant of Al Bashir a controversial case. This controversy began in 
2005 when the UNSC adopted resolution 1593 under Chapter VII stating that the 
situation in Darfur was a threat to international peace and security.78
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 It was adopted by 
a vote of eleven in favor to none against, but with four abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, 
China, and the United States). As aforementioned, this was the first time that the UNSC 
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refers a case to the ICC under Chapter VII. The next section investigates whether the 
ICC has jurisdiction over Al Bashir and what exactly a Chapter VII resolution entails in 
regard to the statute of the Court. It also examines the authority of the ICC over 
nationals of non-party states when mandated under Chapter VII. 
 
4.4 Chapter VII Resolution 1593  
The ICC has the authority to investigate nationals of party states who are 
suspected of the gravest of crimes. It should only be referred to as a case of last resort, 
that is, only if national courts have failed or are too corrupt to proceed with a fair trial. 
Article 13 of the Statute explains how state parties may refer crime cases to the Court 
on the condition that the cases are within its jurisdiction. The UNSC may also refer to 
Court crimes that have been committed in a situation that threatens or breaches 
international peace and security pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Art.13).79 
The Prosecutor in charge investigates the situation and decides whether there are 
reasonable grounds to take it to the Pre-Trial Chamber. Thereafter, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber composed of one or three judges, proceeds with the judicial aspects and 
decides whether or not to grant the prosecutor a warrant of arrest.80
The Pre-Trial Chamber studied the application for the warrant of arrest of Al 
Bashir and granted it. Article 58 of the Statute states that if the Pre-Trial Chamber 
judges that there is enough evidence and information to believe that the person, in this 
case Al Bashir being the head of state and the commander in chief of the Sudanese 
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armed forces, has committed the crimes alleged and that those crimes are within the 
Court’s jurisdiction, it may issue a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear before the 
Court.  
However, and as aforementioned, Sudan is not party to the Rome Statute and 
allegedly not forced to cooperate with the ICC.  Article 86 Part IX of the Rome Statute 
emphasizes that only “States parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this 
Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court.”81
“The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the 
maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the 
Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may 
determine. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United 
Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies 
of which they are members.”
 Yet this commitment is not binding upon states 
that did not join the ICC, unless they have declared that they accept to cooperate with 
the Court’s jurisdiction or an ad hoc arrangement or agreement with the Court. 
However, one exception exists, and this is in Article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute on the 
exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction which affirms that non-party states may be obliged 
under an international obligation to cooperate with the Court by a resolution of the SC 
issued under Chapter VII. In fact, Chapter VII Article 48 of the UN Charter obliges 
member states to heed SC decisions. UN Charter Chapter VII, Article 48 states: 
82
 
 
Furthermore, UNSCR 1593 (2005), issued under Chapter VII, reiterates in paragraph 2 
that the SC: 
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“Decides that the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in 
Darfur, shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the 
Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing that 
States not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute, urges 
all States and concerned regional and other international organizations to 
cooperate fully.”83
 
  
UNSCR 1593 did not indict or mention Al Bashir. However it urges all parties to 
cooperate fully with the ICC’s decisions. It was only after the ICC indicted Al Bashir 
that the latter became involved in the matter.  
Ian Brownlie contends that it might seem controversial to compel in a Chapter VII 
resolution a non-party state to cooperate with the ICC because the Rome Statue was 
principally established for states who willingly give permission to the Court in order 
for it to exercise its jurisdiction.84
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 Issued under Chapter VII, the resolution 1593 
eliminated the difference between party states and non-party states and their 
compliance with the ICC. It does so by stating that what is taking place in Darfur is 
threatening international peace and security. Consequently, the UNSC has to fulfill its 
duties in accordance with international laws and no matter what controversy its 
resolutions might create. Moreover, and since the ICC indictment has the international 
legal cover for this resolution, it has acquired legitimately the power to force on a 
national of Sudan, a non-party member to the Statute, its indictment.  However, even 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter the ICC still faces many other limitations in its 
Statute and the Court’s Powers. These restrictions are examined next. 
According to Article 58, the arrest warrant clearly states: 
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“(a) There are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; and (b) The arrest of the person 
appears necessary:  
(i) To ensure the person's appearance at trial; 
(ii) To ensure that the person does not obstruct or endanger the 
investigation or the court proceedings; or 
(iii) Where applicable, to prevent the person from continuing with the 
commission of that crime or a related crime which is within the 
jurisdiction of the Court and which arises out of the same circumstances.” 
 
The Prosecutor’s powers are constrained by many limitations, such as the wait period 
of twelve months before investigating, or prosecuting the suspect after the UNSC has 
issued a resolution under Chapter VII referring a crime to the ICC in Article 16 of the 
Statute: 
“No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under 
this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution 
adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested 
the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the 
same conditions.”85
 
 
Moreover, such a resolution will require a majority of nine votes, including the five 
permanent members of the Council. Consequently, a single veto can annul such a 
request.  
 
4.5 Immunity or the Absence of Immunity for Government Officials  
Another pertinent question concerns whether or not government officials enjoy 
immunity or whether heads of states may be prosecuted. The convention on the Non-
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Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity 
Adopted by the General Assembly resolution 2391 (XXIII) of 26 November 1968 that 
came into force on the 11th of November 1970, in accordance with article VIII states in 
Article I, assures that there is no such immunity granted to officials when the crimes 
involved are “grave breaches”: 
“No statutory limitation shall apply to the following crimes, irrespective of the 
date of their commission: (a) War crimes as they are defined in the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, of 8 August 1945 and confirmed by 
resolutions 3 (1) of 13 February 1946 and 95 (I) of 11 December 1946 of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations, particularly the "grave breaches" 
enumerated in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the protection of 
war victims; (b) Crimes against humanity whether committed in time of war or in 
time of peace as they are defined in the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal, Nuremberg, of 8 August 1945 and confirmed by resolutions 3 (I) of 13 
February 1946 and 95 (I) of 11 December 1946 of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, eviction by armed attack or occupation and inhuman acts 
resulting from the policy of apartheid, and the crime of genocide as defined in 
the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, even if such acts do not constitute a violation of the domestic law of 
the country in which they were committed.” 
 
Furthermore, Article II clearly states that:  
“If any of the crimes mentioned in article I is committed, the provisions of this 
Convention shall apply to representatives of the State authority and private 
individuals who, as principals or accomplices, participate in or who directly 
incite others to the commission of any of those crimes, or who conspire to 
commit them, irrespective of the degree of completion, and to representatives of 
the State authority who tolerate their commission.”86
This means that those conditions also apply to presidents whether they are in power or 
not. We have also seen in the previous chapter that article IV of the Geneva Convention 
on Genocide states that “Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts 
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enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally 
responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.”87
The SC is not going further than reaffirming existing international law and 
suggesting a particular application in a particular situation.
 This means that no matter 
what the statute of the individual being indicted is, he does not enjoy immunity, 
everybody is equally accountable and punishable. 
88 The UNSCR 1593 is in 
complete harmony with already existent laws and jus cogens. Nonetheless, Sudan 
continues to refuse to cooperate with the Court, which is left paralyzed and unable to 
bring Al Bashir to the Hague. This explains why the ICC Prosecutor Ocampo has been 
pushing the Pre-Trial chamber to reconsider the accusation of Genocide that he had 
included in his first application of an arrest warrant in the name of Al Bashir. The 
prosecutor succeeded when the ICC declared that it is considering charging the 
President of Sudan with the crime of genocide on February 3rd 2010. “The Appeals 
Chamber directed the Pre-Trial Chamber to decide anew whether or not the arrest 
warrant should be extended to cover the charge of genocide.”89  If the Pre-Trial 
Chamber decides that there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt that Al Bashir was 
involved in the crime of genocide, then under article IV of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide this person shall be tried no 
matter what his status is.90
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In addition, article 5 of the Convention affirms that “The Contracting Parties 
undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary 
legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in particular, 
to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts 
enumerated in Article 3.”91
“Irrelevance of official capacity” states that: “1) This Statute shall apply equally 
to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In particular, 
official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government 
or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no case 
exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in 
and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.   
 Moreover, Articles 6 through 9 of the Convention, state that 
in case the national tribunals are not competent enough, they should contract an 
international penal tribunal. They also specify the kind of tribunal that should lead the 
trial. Article 7 states that genocide should not be treated like other political crimes 
because extradition is not the objective. In genocide cases, the parties involved act in 
accordance with their laws and treaties.  Article 8 is also very important as it assures 
that any party involved may request from the organs of the UN to take action under 
Charter in order to prevent and stop any acts of genocide or any other acts listed under 
article 3.  Article 9 allows for directing the parties to the ICJ in case the parties 
involved in the dispute disagreed about the interpretation or the enforcement of this 
Convention on Genocide and all acts enumerated under Article 3. Furthermore, Article 
27 of the ICC Rome Statute confirms that heads of states do not have immunity and 
could be subjected to a warrant of arrest as well as be arrested and tried. Article 27 thus 
states the following: 
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2) Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official 
capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar 
the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.”92
 
  
Given that Sudan still refuses to cooperate with the ICC, how then, draw in Al 
Bashir to Court? 
  
4.6 Bringing Al Bashir to Court  
The ICC does not have any armed forces and thus cannot send anyone to arrest 
Al Bashir. It is not the law’s duty to have such forces. It rather relies completely on 
states and their national authorities to arrest their own nationals when guilty. Thus 
Article 86 of the Statute sets a general obligation on all states: “States Parties shall, in 
accordance with the provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in its 
investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.”93 Nor does 
the Court have an enforcement mechanism of its own. Moreover, the Court cannot 
“seize evidentiary material, compel witnesses to give testimony, nor investigate the 
scene where crimes have been allegedly committed. The ICC does not have its own 
jails: sentences will have to be served in the facilities of State Parties which have 
volunteered to offer these.”94
Other obstacles facing Al Bashir’s trial include state sovereignty. Presidents 
invoke state sovereignty to oppose any interference by the Court under the pretext of 
 Consequently, how will Al Bashir be tried?  
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protecting their government from hegemony and foreign interference. Al Bashir has 
invoked this issue against the international investigation, alongside his absolute 
rejection of the legitimacy of the international criminal tribunal all-together. The AU 
and LAS have tried to stall and contested the legality of the ICC indictment by 
referring to Article 16 of the Rome Statute, on the deferral of the investigation or 
prosecution, which states that: “No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or 
proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the SC, in a resolution 
adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN, has requested the Court to that 
effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.”95
4.7 Overcoming the Obstacles 
 
However, the ICC did act in accordance with this article. All the arrest warrants were 
issued after more than twelve months of the adoption of resolution 1593 in 2005. In 
fact Al Bashir’s warrant of arrest was only issued in March 2009. All these obstacles 
make Ocampo’s accusation against Al Bashir difficult to execute, and to lure him to 
Court in the near future is rather slim.  
 
 By signing the Rome Statute the member states pledged to arrest any national 
guilty of crimes and extradite him. In Sudan’s case, since it is not a member state, the 
ICC is only capable of indicting Al Bashir. However, Ocampo is currently working on 
providing more proof to the Court in order to convict him of the crime of genocide. As 
aforementioned, the Pre-Trial Chamber has already agreed to reconsider a previous 
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decision about adding the crime of genocide to the seven other indictments of Al 
Bashir. “The Pre-Trial Chamber will be looking into the case again in order to decide 
whether to add the charge of genocide to the arrest warrant.”96
 A jus cogens is a universal and non-derogable law. Jus cogens is Latin for 
compelling law; that is compelling to all states and one that supersedes all other types 
of law irrespective of any treaty. It is higher than a Chapter VII resolution or any other 
convention. According to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
the legal criteria for a general law or principle to become a jus cogens are: 1) “to have 
the status as a norm of general international law; 2) to get the acceptance by the 
international community of states as a whole, meaning by most of states; 3) the 
immunity from derogation; and 4) that it will be modifiable only by a new norm having 
the same status.”
  The crime of genocide 
allows the Court to have not only UN Chapter VII on its side but also the Geneva 
Convention on Genocide, which is considered to be a jus cogens.   
97
 Jus cogens are usually considered norms, such as the prohibition against the 
aggressive use of force, war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, slavery, racial 
discrimination, piracy, and torture.  The Nuremberg Tribunal also added that jus 
cogens is applicable to individual, criminal liability. Therefore, if the ICC charges Al 
Bashir with genocide, Sudan will be compelled under international law to arrest the 
president liable of grave crimes punishable by jus cogens, not just by the ICC, which 
was referred by the UNSCR under Chapter VII. In this case Sudan is obliged to arrest 
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its own president. In effect the president is expected to hand himself over to the Hague. 
In addition, and according to Article 89 of the Rome Statute states that the Court “may 
transit a request for the arrest and surrender of a person...to any state on the territory of 
which that person may be found.”98
4.8 Conclusion 
 The ICC may not be completely efficient in bringing criminals to justice but it is 
certainly on the right path of becoming a very influential institution. Even if Al Bashir 
still enjoys his freedom, the arrest warrant has already managed to disrupt his safe 
haven and his political stature. Now that the immunity of a current president has been 
challenged, the ICC is setting a precedent. Heads of states, government officials and 
war lords have reason to think twice before committing war crimes and other atrocities. 
Even if the country is too weak and too corrupt to bring criminals to justice, there is a 
way now through the ICC to put an end to impunity. The ICC should gain more 
influence as it achieves endorsement from other states that have yet to ratify the statute. 
Nevertheless, some may prefer to postpone pursuing justice, arguing that resolving the 
conflict and achieving stability is more important than implementing international 
justice. The next chapter concludes the thesis by examining the twin obligations of 
achieving stability and applying international justice. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion: Justice, Reconciliation and Peace in Sudan 
 
5.1 Summing up the Argument 
 Despite the legality of UNSCR 1593 and the power of the ICC to enforce 
justice, the latter almost always comes with a cost. As academics studying a country in 
conflict, we must examine the structural roots of each conflict and look beyond issue 
specific aspects. This concluding chapter considers what constitutes a just solution for 
the conflict in Sudan. It argues that there can be no peace without justice and 
reconciliation. In this case, what is more important, stability or justice when resolving 
the conflict in Sudan? In other words, is it more important to stop the killings at the 
expense of maintaining the system or undertaking structural and revolutionary changes 
even if this will come at a very heavy cost? 
 
5.2 Justice, Reconciliation and Peace in Sudan 
 In order to analyze whether social and structural change are deemed necessary in 
the midst of conflict intervention, we must recognize that there are three processes in 
resolving ethnic conflicts that are fundamentally and qualitatively different and are not 
60 
 
designed to reach the same end point. These processes are conflict settlement, conflict 
resolution, and reconciliation.99
 The goal of conflict settlement is to seek a formal termination of a conflict based 
on mutual interest. The issue of stability and system maintenance versus social and 
structural change is dependent on the “goals of the agreement, parties to the agreement, 
nature of the desired relationship, importance of mutual acceptance, and importance of 
future relations between the parties.”
 
100
5.3 Conflict Settlement and Conflict Resolution 
 This is represented by a formal agreement 
between the contending parties that reflects the power relations and dynamics between 
them. Such a settlement does not necessarily give fair attention to the needs of the 
parties and often does not stand for the weaker party’s long-term goals. The settlement 
does not concern itself necessarily with relationships between societies or with 
recognizing each party’s legitimacy and needs. The parties can have a cold or warm 
peace as long as their immediate interests are met and as long as they enjoy a tolerable 
arrangement of coexistence.   
 
 Sometimes system maintenance and stability are more important than 
revolutionary change. In conflict settlement, violence is reduced or avoided all together 
by coming to an arrangement or compromise. While conflict settlement is in no way a 
long-term solution it can be useful in certain contexts to avoid further escalation. 
Conflict settlements can best be described as formal agreements, where the future 
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relationship between the parties is limited to abiding by these agreements. Furthermore, 
mutual acceptance of one another is not important and any historical responsibility and 
truth is ignored. Most importantly in conflict settlement, there is no requirement of 
social and political restructuring, which makes these agreements easier to implement, if 
not to enforce over time.101
 On the other hand, conflict resolution goes beyond settlement and seeks to 
address the causes of conflict and to reach historic compromises. The agreement 
addresses the basic human needs of both sides, regardless of the power dynamics 
 A perfect example of conflict settlement is the CPA that 
ended the civil war between North and South of Sudan. After a devastating twenty-year 
war that left thousands dead, millions of displaced, and billions of dollars in damaged 
infrastructure, a settlement was arranged that ended the conflict. This would be viewed 
as a conflict settlement since the different parties at stake, and the only relationship 
between those contending parties, is to adhere in principle to the agreement. 
 One can argue against such an approach as it does not deal with justice for the 
victims on both sides and because no party took responsibility or admitted any wrong 
doing in regards to human rights abuses. However in this context, conflict settlement is 
the correct approach as it quickly puts an end to a protracted conflict. An intervening 
party cannot in good conscious allow this hurting stalemate to continue in the hopes of 
reaching a restructuring of the social and political relationship between the North and 
the South. As mentioned before, social change is dependent on context and as conflict 
analysts, we must be able to recognize the limitations of the conflicts we face and 
temper our expectations and goals accordingly. 
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between them. The political needs of both parties are addressed equitably and breaks 
away from the traditional power relations to establish a new relationship based on 
equality and reciprocity. Unlike conflict settlement, conflict resolution seeks not only 
coexistence, but also cooperation and a sustainable peace in which parties cooperate 
together and avoid further contention against one another.102
 Conflict resolution is best described as principled compromise, where there is 
genuine peace, and good relations are built between the parties. Within conflict 
resolution, the parties must mutually accept one another and legitimize each other’s 
values. The satisfaction of basic human needs is the cornerstone of successful conflict 
resolution, and substantial restructuring of the social and political structure is necessary 
to achieve the desired change. 
  
103
 It is within the context of conflict resolution that the status quo is no longer 
acceptable. It recognizes that stability and system maintenance are not enough and that 
significant social change must occur. In this context, conflict interveners must 
recognize that their role is that of a catalyst for change, and that they must keep 
themselves “visible and available” to all parties to assess and share responsibility for 
the consequences that may develop.
 
104
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 Azar’s Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) theory 
is ideal in this case to emphasize the importance of social and structural change in order 
to effectively resolve protracted conflicts. PSC refers to conflict situations, which are 
characterized by “the prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for 
such basic needs as security, recognition, and acceptance, fair access to political 
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institutions and economic participation.”105
5.4 Reconciliation and Justice 
 These variables must be all satisfied to 
effectively resolve such conflicts and it is a clear point where the status quo will not be 
sufficient, with the exception of reaching temporary settlement. 
 
The final and most important process is reconciliation. Reconciliation is a 
particular progression that seeks to attain a mutual legitimacy as the basis of a sound 
relationship between the parties. “The open, public, and socially based granting of 
legitimacy – the culmination of the process- becomes the defining feature of the 
relationship and the cornerstone of mutual recognition and genuine security.”106
Furthermore, reconciliation can only occur when the truth is brought to bear, 
particularly truths about wrongdoings. Testimonies about past atrocities should be 
 
Through changing society and reforming the political system, reconciliation 
achieves a solid relationship between the parties and puts an end to the conflict between 
them. For reconciliation to take root, justice, truth, historical responsibility and changes 
in the structural system that defines the parties must be addressed. The term of 
reference between the parties no longer becomes existing power dynamics, but rather 
the principle of justice for all. Justice can be achieved by bringing those who have 
committed inhumane crimes against weaker parties, holding all persons that violated 
basic human rights accountable, and returning lost land and property to those who were 
victimized.  
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established and publicly shared through commissions and investigations. Hard facts 
about human rights violations, the emotional and psychological impact on victims, and 
their many interpretations must be analyzed and discussed to achieve a viable 
reconciliation and peace.107
Justice and responsibility lead to the kind of structural changes necessary to 
bring about a lasting peace. These structural changes can be a dramatic departure from 
the status quo and are determined by equality, human dignity, and international law 
regardless of the power of the perpetrators, as they will “inevitably lose some of the 
privileges they have unjustly gained.”
 
108
The best example of a successful reconciliation process remains the South 
African case. The plan was for societal reconciliation to be effected throughout the 
population, “while avoiding vindictiveness on the one hand and a disregard for wrongs 
and sufferings on the other.”
 Khartoum’s government, feeling that their 
authority is being challenged, threatened that the ICC prosecution will make the 
situation in Darfur worse. Indeed, as soon as the warrant of arrest was issued, Al Bashir 
ordered the eviction of numerous aid workers and peacekeepers, aid organizations and 
relief missions from Sudan, which exacerbated the humanitarian crisis. 
109
I have hitherto argued that while ideological and philosophical differences do 
occur between advocates of stability and system maintenance, and those social justice 
 Together with some expression of responsibility and 
reparations, major structural changes occurred that allowed the people to accommodate 
one another and their history.  
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theories who demand great social change for the greater good, the answer lies in the 
context of the conflict and the goals we choose to achieve as we work towards 
resolution. “Powerful forces who are stakeholders in conflict exist at all levels of 
conflict resolution interaction. They have an investment in the status quo. At the same 
time, critics of traditional methods of conflict resolution with their emphasis on justice 
overlook the interdependency of systems maintenance and social justice outcomes 
particularly with respect to implementation and governance of agreements.”110
As Nadim Rouhana argues, it is during reconciliation that we seek structural 
change and need philosophical justifications for decisions made by those who seek 
international justice. The CPA has come a long way, however many are warning of its 
fragility to maintain peace. Aid organization notes that north and south Sudan are “far 
behind in their implementation of the most contentious provisions of the CPA.”
 
111
The goal should be a historic reconciliation between the different ethnic groups 
and political parties. The importance of mutual acceptance cannot be emphasized 
enough; the terms of reference should be justice to all parties and peoples, long-term 
interest should be a goal for weaker and stronger parties. The truth about wrongdoing 
should be widely acknowledged, as well as the historical responsibility commonly 
faced by Khartoum. Finally, major social and political restructuring should transpire. 
  The 
peace agreement expires in 2011 and many of its provisions have still not been 
implemented. Nor are other attempts at reconciliation, such as Qatar’s recent mediation 
and concomitant cease-fire declaration, led to peace in Sudan.  
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Justice should be the framework of this reconciliation in order for a new relationship to 
begin between the parties. However, “Paradoxically, it might be harder to accept 
responsibility in cases where injustice can be partly undone,” such as the displacement 
of an ethnic group that demands to return to their villages in Darfur. Sadly, in cases 
where the injustice cannot be undone such as “in cases where the ethnic group has been 
eliminated or almost eliminated,”112 it is easier to grant justice and reconcile. Albeit it is 
sad to admit it, yet the facts are that justice and reconciliation may be easier to reach 
when there remains very little people left to compensate, refugees to repatriate, or 
homes to return to. It is then easier to face the responsibility, repent and come to terms 
with the injustices perpetrated.113
5.5 Toward Peace in Sudan 
 
 
 What then is more important, stability or the principle of change and social 
justice? Evidently for Ocampo, Al Bashir is a criminal that should be brought to justice 
for committing grave crimes according to international law, even if the short-term 
effect may destabilize civil peace and stability in Sudan. For the prosecutor, too many 
people have lost their lives, and genocide was perpetrated while the international 
community stood still without trying to stop it. For the regional as well as international 
heads of states, the arrest warrant is unacceptable, they do not want to set a precedent 
and risk being next. The ICC is one of many institutions that lack universal support. 
Only two Arab states, Jordan and Comoros, have signed its Rome Statute and the most 
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powerful states such as the USA, China, and Russia etc. are still considering the 
consequences of becoming party states.  
Al Bashir although indicted was re-elected in April with 68% of the votes,114 
although widely believed that they were rigged, the results still got international 
recognition and the President was re-inaugurated. However, one day prior to his 
inauguration the ICC takes an unprecedented step and refers the case of Sudan back to 
the UNSC pressurizing the government of Sudan to take action in regard of both 
criminals Former Minister Ahmed Haroun and militia leader Ali Muhammad Al Abd-
Al-Rahman that had been indicted earlier than Al Bashir. Also A special adviser to the 
ICC prosecutor, Beatrice le Fraper, told the BBC that similar action might be taken in 
relation to President Bashir, who is also wanted by the ICC for alleged war crimes in 
Darfur under a warrant issued in March 2009.  "The arrest warrant will not disappear 
[on Thursday] when there is an inauguration of President al-Bashir," said Ms le Fraper.  
"It's very important that all those who attend the inauguration remember that it is first 
and foremost the inauguration of a man who has been charged with the crime of 
extermination." 115
 After the indictment of the seated president of Sudan the situation in Darfur 
worsened and it has caused several tribal and ethnic tensions all over the country. 
However, the long-term effects of indicting a war criminal need to be weighed. What is 
the cost of social justice? It is believed that Al Bashir was granted the Presidency in 
April’s elections to avoid more bloodshed and more importantly to keep the status quo 
until the people of the South participate in the referendum that will take place in 
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January 2011 and decide whether they want to secede from the North. Al Bashir has 
publicly stated that he will respect the outcome of the referendum, but many find it 
difficult to trust him, especially that 80% of the oil reserves are in the South.116
In a personal interview conducted with a special adviser to Al Bashir, when 
asked if he supports secession, the advisor answered: “I am deeply saddened by the 
idea of secession but I believe that the South will secede and that is the best choice for 
them to gain independence since the government of Al Bashir has not been fair in their 
regard.” The latter went on to declare, “the current authority in Khartoum is the main 
obstacle for peace and development. I believe that if Al Bashir was removed from 
power, Sudan will have a better chance to reach stability and prosperity.” He also 
added “Sudan is passing through a very critical phase in history. The referendum will 
decide whether the south should remain part of a united Sudan, or become an 
independent state.”
   
117
Al Bashir has recently won the elections but the oppositions withdrew from them 
charging electoral fraud. Many also warn that bringing Al Bashir to justice may disrupt 
the very critical and fragile stability that Sudan is enjoying. And although many fear that 
Sudan might plunge into yet another civil war, and that the time is not ripe for achieving 
social justice, others contend that if he is brought to justice, it might also be the best 
thing that has ever happened to Sudan. Trying Al Bashir is a matter of bringing back 
justice to the victims of Darfur as well as the many civil war victims in Sudan at large. 
Bringing justice to those people will contribute to conflict reconciliation, which allows 
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for hope in peace for the people of Sudan. On the domestic level, bringing justice to the 
people of Sudan would be a matter of responsibility and accountability, while on the 
international level heads of states and war lords will start thinking twice before 
committing war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other atrocities. After all, it may 
be the case that sometimes structural and revolutionary change is worth the human costs 
associated with it, for this is the only route to achieve justice. 
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Annex 1  
 
 
 
 
SECURITY COUNCIL REFERS SITUATION IN DARFUR, SUDAN, TO 
PROSECUTOR 
 
OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
Resolution 1593 (2005) Adopted by Vote of 11 in Favour 
 
To None Against, with 4 Abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, China, United States) 
Security Council 5158th Meeting (Night) 31/03/2005 
 
 
The Security Council, 
 
Taking note of the report of the International Commission of Inquiry on violations of 
international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur (S/2005/60), 
 
Recalling article 16 of the Rome Statute under which no investigation or prosecution may 
be commenced or proceeded with by the International Criminal Court for a period of 12 
months after a Security Council request to that effect, 
 
Also recalling articles 75 and 79 of the Rome Statute and encouraging States to 
contribute to the ICC Trust Fund for Victims, 
 
Taking note of the existence of agreements referred to in Article 98-2 of the Rome 
Statute, 
 
Determining that the situation in Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international 
peace and security, 
 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,  
 
1. Decides to refer the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court; 
 
2. Decides that the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, 
shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the 
Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing that States not party to the 
Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute, urges all States and concerned 
regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully; 
 
3. Invites the Court and the African Union to discuss practical arrangements that will 
facilitate the work of the Prosecutor and of the Court, including the possibility of 
conducting proceedings in the region, which would contribute to regional efforts in the 
fight against impunity; 
 
4. Also encourages the Court, as appropriate and in accordance with the Rome Statute, to 
support international cooperation with domestic efforts to promote the rule of law, protect 
human rights and combat impunity in Darfur;  
 
5. Also emphasizes the need to promote healing and reconciliation and encourages in this 
respect the creation of institutions, involving all sectors of Sudanese society, such as truth 
and/or reconciliation commissions, in order to complement judicial processes and thereby 
reinforce the efforts to restore long- lasting peace, with African Union and international 
support as necessary; 
 
6. Decides that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a contributing 
State outside Sudan which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that contributing State for all 
alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in Sudan established or 
authorized by the Council or the African Union, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has 
been expressly waived by that contributing State; 
 
7. Recognizes that none of the expenses incurred in connection with the referral including 
expenses related to investigations or prosecutions in connection with that referral, shall 
be borne by the United Nations and that such costs shall be borne by the parties to the 
Rome Statute and those States that wish to contribute voluntarily; 
 
8. Invites the Prosecutor to address the Council within three months of the date of 
adoption of this resolution and every six months thereafter on actions taken pursuant to 
this resolution; 
 
9. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 
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